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SPECIAL EDUCATION, EQUAL
PROTECTION AND EDUCATION
FINANCE: DOES THE INDIVIDUALS
WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT
VIOLATE A GENERAL EDUCATION
STUDENT'S FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO
EDUCATION?
INTRODUCTION
Nationwide, state and federally mandated costs of special educa-
tion are forcing local school districts to drastically reduce funding and
educational services to general education students in violation of their
equal protection guarantees.' Parts I and II of this Note will establish
that state and federal special education laws enacted over the past.
twenty-five years have caused, and continue to contribute to, a reduc-
tion in general education services. 2 Parts HI and IV will analyze this
phenomena from the perspective of the general education student. 3
Part IV posits that such action taken under state law constitutes a
violation of general education students' equal protection rights under
many state constitutions.' Part IV also argues that such action should
constitute a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.'
' See discussion infra notes 6-24 and accoinpanying text; see also Albert. Shankcr, Where We
Stand, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Dec. 8, 1995 (citing RICHARD ROFIISTEIN & KAREN HAWLEY MILES,
WHERE'S TOE MONEY GONE?: CIIANGES IN TIE LEVEL AND COMPOSITION OF EDUCATION SPENDING
(1996)); Special Education Programs Reauthorization: Testimony on the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act Before the Senate Comm. an Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. 1-5 (jam 29,
1997) (statement of David S. Wolk, Superintendent of Schools, Rutland, Vermont).
9!
	 infra notes 6-129 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 131-320 and accompanying text.
4 See infra notes 252-320 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 252-320 and accompanying text.
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I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GENERAL EDUCATION SPENDING AND A
BRIEF HISTORY OF SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW
A. Recent Studies and Educators Reveal a Nationwide Reduction in
General Education Funding
Reductions in general education spending and services are di-
rectly attributable to the enactment of the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act ("IDEA") and statutes in every state enacted pursuant
to IDEA requirements.° Approximately ninety percent of students na-
tionwide are general education students..? State and national studies
conducted over the past thirty years show that the share of all spending
received by general education declined from approximately eighty
percent in 1967 to fifty-six percent in 1996. 8 During this time, expen-
ditures devoted to special education more than quadrupled from four
percent to seventeen percent.° Additionally, the same studies show that
while general education has received only twenty-six percent of all new
education funds over the past thirty years, special education consumed
nearly forty percent of these funds.'°
While the average annual per pupil expenditure for general edu-
cation students is approximately $6000 in most states, it often costs
more than four times that amount to educate a special education
student." The cost to educate one special education student can some-
times reach nearly $200,000 annually." Additionally, the costs of imple-
6 See, e.g., Steve Twedt, Districts Hit Hard by Way State Funds Special Students, Pri-rsaukcit
Pos't'-GAZETTE, Aug. 5, 1997, at Al; see also infra notes 24, 49 and accompanying text.
7
 See, e.g., Special Education Programs Reauthorization, supra note 1. The term "general
education" is used to describe any services or students which are not deemed "special education"
as discussed in this Note. See id.
8 See ROTHSTEIN & MILES, supra note 1.
9 See id.
19 See id.; see also Twedt, supra note 6, at Al.
IL See, e.g., Karen Avenoso, Payxant Calling for Big Cuts in Special Education, BOSTON GLOBE,
Feb. 13, 1997, at A50 [hereinafter Payzant]; Kelly Burgess, An Especially Challenging Dilemma,
Prt-rsaintGit Posr-GazErri., May 24, 1995, at N2; Special Ed Takes Bigger Budget Bite, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT LEDGER-STAR, Dec. 28, 1997, at B1; Kate Zernike, Special Education, A System Disabled,
Testing the Limits Pioneering Law Heels the Strain of Wide Demands, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 30, 1997,
at Al [hereinafter Mar. 30, 1997].
12 See David Shaw, Cato-Meridian Board Concerned About Cost of Special Ed, SYRACUSE POST
STANDARD, Nov. 25, 1997, at RI; Kate Zernike, Special Education, A System Disabled; Bad Behavior,
Special Treatment; Many Students' Problems not Related to Education, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 31, 1997,
at Al [hereinafter Mar. 31, 1997]. The highest expenditures for special education students occur
when public schools must pay for private tutors, caretakers and placements in private facilities.
See Zernike, Mar. 30, 1997, supra note 11, at Al.
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menting special education mandates across the country arc extremely
high and continue to rise.'"
Professional educators and school administrators fault the legally
required rising costs of special education for cuts to general education
funds and services." In Massachusetts, for example, educators com-
mented that schools are forced to siphon money away from general
education academic expenses to pay for special education students."
In a 1996 report, the Massachusetts Association of School Superinten-
dents warned that the increased cost of special education is seriously
compromising regular education programs." The same report showed
that money originally budgeted for raising school standards and creat-
ing new general education academic programs instead is being fun-
neled into special education mandates.' 7 Additionally, Massachusetts
special education expenditures have increased by thirty-five percent in
recent years, requiring some districts to cut general education budgets
by seven percent annually."
Similarly, educators in other states fault special education for
causing decreases in general education funding.' 9 The governor of
Minnesota, for example, recently attempted to curb special education
spending by decreasing state special education aid to local communi-
ties." There, state lawmakers readily acknowledged that special educa-
tion mandates drain money from general education. 2 ' Nebraska legis-
13 See infra note 24. Commentators note, for example, that special education accounts for
nearly 40% of expenditures in the Boston Public School System, although only 20% or the
students arc special education students. See Avenoso, Payzant, supra note 11, at A50. Additionally,
in Virginia, special education costs have almost doubled in the past five years. See Special Ed Takes
Bigger Budget Bite, supra note 1 i, at Bl. Similarly, news accounts from New York note that the
cost of special education services is up significantly. See Shaw, supra note 12, at Bl. Likewise, in
Alaska, school districts are reeling from the new demands for the increased costs of special
education. See Rosemary Shinoltara, Special-Ed Costs Could Rise, ANCHORAGE DAILY News, Nov.
19, 1997, at Bl.
14 See infra note 24.
15 See Zernike, Mar. 30, 1997, supra note 11, at Al; Zernike, Mar. 31, 1997, supra note 12, at
Al; see also Lauren Markoe, Special Ed Bill Worries Parents, PATRIOT LEDGER, jam 13, 1998, at 1
(noting that the federal government contributes only seven percent or special education funding
nationwide).
16 See Tim Cornell, Stale Ads to Curb Bilingual Education, BosToN I Itatm.n, Feb. 11, 1997, at
15.
17 See Karen Avenoso„Special Education Siphoning School Funds, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 11,
1997, at BI [hereinafter Special Education],
16 See id.
15 See infra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
2° See Rob Holakainen & Mary Jane Smetanka, Paying for Special Education, MINNEAPOLIS ST.
PAUL STAR-TRIBUNE, Mar. 13, 1995, at 1A.
21 See id,
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lators also recognized a problem as funds were shifted from general
education to special education." Iowa school systems cut general edu-
cation programming by nearly $20 million over the past ten years to
cover special education mandates. 23 Overall, educators nationwide note
that special education costs continue to rise because of court mandates,
and these costs are the primary reason for general education budget
cuts."
B. A Brief History of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
In order to properly understand why special education costs have
consumed such a large portion of education budgets nationwide, it is
22 See Deborah Shanahan, Schools Forced to Look for Special Ed Savings, OMAHA WORLD- I I ER-
ALD, June 26, 1995, at 9SF.
23
 See Special Education, DES MOINES REGISTER, Oct. 5, 1996, at 5.
24 See, e.g., Beth Frerking, Special Education Mandates Come Under Increased Scrutiny, GRAND
RAPIDS PRESS, Apr. 2, 1995, at A6. In Massachusetts, the cost of special education rose from 5500
million to $1.2 billion between 1985 and 1995, forcing communities to cut spending on general
education. See Time to Reform, Lawmakers Should Curb Special Education Abuses, WORCESTER
TELEGRAM & GAZETTE, Jan. 5, 1998, atA6; Zernike, Mar. 30, 1997, supra note II, at Al. Legislators
have noted that the high costs of special education are caused by unnecessary services at the
expense of regular education students. See Finneran Critical of Special Ed Costs, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 25, 1997, at 88. Additionally, news stories note that soaring legal costs and the threat of
litigation are scaring schools into providing special services to students who may not warrant
them because recent court decisions have required schools to offer an even broader array of
special education services. See Zernike, Mar. 30, 1997, supra note 11, at Al. Others have observed
that parents believe they can demand any service, and schools believe the schools have to pay for
it. See id. Additionally, even though experts say there is no question the law has accomplished its
original intent, live out of six special education students arc not disabled in the way the law
envisioned. See id.
lu Virginia, general eduCation cuts have counterbalanced the increased' costs for special
education programs. See Isabel Gough, Lancaster School Chief Outlines Funding Needs, RICHMOND
NEWS LEADER, Mar. 5, 1991, at 26. In New York, the number of general education teachers has
decreased because of special education costs. See John Doherty, Graying of 'Boomers' Spells School
Tax Woes, SYRACUSE I IERALD AMERICAN, Apr. 28, 1996, at DI. In Arizona, millions were cut from
general education budgets because of the increased costs of special education programs. See Lori
Baker, Washington District to Cut Budget, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, July 16, 1997, at 6. In Illinois,
increased costs arc due to state and federal mandates, and Chicago schools are forced to make
millions in general education cuts because of court-mandated special education programs. See
Jacquelyn Heard, Shrinkage of School Deficit Seen, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 22, 1999, at 2; John
O'Connor, Many Issues in Subdistrict 7 Race, SPRINGFIELD STATE JOURNAL-REGISTER, Nov. 2, 1995,
at 9; Rosalind Rossi, Schools Face $416 Million Question, CHICAGO-SUN TIMES, July 13, 1993, at 1.
In Connecticut, education cost increases of over 25% are due to special education expenses. See
Eric Rich, Special Education Costs are Spiraling, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 6, 1995, at 112. In
Pennsylvania, general education parents are worried that their children arc being shortchanged
because special education costs over four times as much per student. See Burgess, supra note 11,
at N2. Additionally, news accounts state that general education budget deficits arc due to special
education mandates. See Bernie Mixon, District Faces a $258,000 Deficit for Special Education,
HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Apr. 14, 1992, at 12.
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first necessary to examine the IDEA, statc special education statutes
and the impetus for their enactment." The IDEA was originally en-
acted as the Education for All Handicapped Children Act ("EAHCA")
in 1975." In 1990, Congress amended the EAHCA to its current form,"
Congress passed the original law in 1975 in response to two landmark
federal district court decisions which held that handicapped and "ex-
ceptional" children are entitled to a publicly supported education. 28
These court decisions held that the exclusion of exceptional children
from a publicly supported education was a violation of Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process guarantees of
the United States Constitution."
1. Two Cases Provide the Impetus for National Special Education
Legislation
The seminal case requiring a free, publicly supported education
for special education students is Mills v. Board of Education." In Mills,
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia held in
1972 that a local school district was required by the United States
Constitution to provide a publicly supported education for disabled
children.'" In Mills, several disabled students brought suit against the
Board of Education of the District of Columbia because they were
denied a publicly supported education," Reasoning that the Fifth
Amendment Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution
was binding on the Board, the court hcid that disabled students were
entitled to a publicly supported education." The deprivation of these
25 See discussion infra notes 26-47 and accompanying text.
26 See II.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 2 (1975), died in I iendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176,179-80 (1982).
27 See Pub, L. No. 101-476,104 Stat. 1103,1142 (1990) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1997))
(modifying legislation found at Pub. L. No. 102-19).
26 See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 180 & n.2 (citing Mills v. Board of Ethic., 348 F. Supp. 866,876
(D.D.C, 1972); Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 334 F. Stipp. 1257,1258
(E.D. Pa. 1971)).
29 See Mills, 348 E Stipp. at 875-76; Pennsylvania Ass'n, 334 F. Stipp. at 1258-59. The term
"exceptional child" as used by these courts is synonymous with the present terminology of "special
education." See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 875-76; Pennsylvania Ass'n, 334 F. Stapp. at 1258-59.
30 348 F. Stipp. 866.
31 See id. at 875-76.
32 See id. at 868-69. Thc students were mentally retarded, emotionally disturbed, physically
handicapped and hyperactive. See id, at 868. The pertinent language of the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution reads, "[silo person shall be .. . deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
99 See Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 875.
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students' equal educational opportunity violated the United States
Constitution
Furthermore, the Mills court held that this constitutional right of
equal protection must be afforded despite the great expense involved."
Additionally, if sufficient funds are not available to finance all of the
necessary services, then available funds must be expended equitably,
and "cannot be permitted to bear more heavily on a disabled child
than a normal child."se Thus, the court held that a publicly supported
education is constitutionally required for disabled children despite the
greater expense involved. 37
Similarly, in 1971, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania held in Pennsylvania Association for Retarded
Children v. Pennsylvania that disabled children could not be denied
access to a free public program of education." At issue was a state
"school admission" statute which prevented disabled students who had
not attained a mental age of five years from entering school. 39 The
court reasoned that depriving these students of equal educational
opportunity violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.'" The court, therefore,
enjoined the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania from applying the statute
to disabled students.4' Thus, just as the Mills court had applied the
Equal Protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, the Pennsylvania
Association court applied the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to disabled students in the several states. 42
2. Congress Responds to Mills and Pennsylvania Association with
Landmark Legislation
In addition to Mills and Pennsylvania Association, courts prior to
the enactment of the EAHCA held that providing public education for
some children but not for others was a denial of Equal Protection
and/or Due Process under the United States Constitution." In re-
34 See id.
35 See id. at 876.
36 Id.
" See id.
33 334 F. Supp. at 1258.
35 See id. at 1260.
4° See id. at 1258.
41 See id.
42 Compare Mills, 348 F. Stipp. at 875-76 (involving violation of equal protection component
of Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause), with Pennsylvania Ass'n, 334 F. Supp. at 1258 (involving
violation of Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause).
43 See, e.g., Panitch v. Wisconsin, 444 F. Supp. 320, 322 (E.D. Wisc. 1977) (denial of education
for disabled students violated Equal Protection Clause); Kruse v. Campbell, 431 F. Supp. 180,
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sponse, Congress enacted the EAHCA as part of an ambitious federal
effort to promote the education of handicapped children." The statute
was passed in response to Congress's perception that a majority of
handicapped children in the United States were either totally excluded
from schools or were sitting idly in classrooms and not receiving an
appropriate education." Legislative history suggests that while Con-
gress sought to open the door of public education to disabled students,
it did not necessarily guarantee any particular level of education once
inside." Recognizing that state and local agencies lacked the necessary
financial resources, Congress intended to offer free publicly supported
education to special education students without lowering the educa-
tional opportunities available to other students. 47
C. The Individuals With Disabilities Education Act Requires a Free
Appropriate Public Education
1. Statutory Requirements of the IDEA
Congress enacted the IDEA to assure that all children with dis-
abilities have access to a free appropriate public education which
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet
their unique needs." Congress recognized in the original enactment
of the EAHCA that there were more than eight million children with
disabilities in the United States, and that the special education needs
of most of these children were not being met." Although the IDEA
leaves to the states the primary responsibility for developing and exe-
cuting educational programs for children with disabilities, it. imposes
significant requirements to be followed in the discharge of that respon-
188-89 (E.D. Va. 1977) (requiring parents of disabled students to partially pay for education
violates Equal Protection Clause); Frederick v. Thomas, 408 F. Stipp. 832, 835 (F..D. Pa. 1976)
(disabled students had proper claim where school failed to provide handicap-specific instruction,
denying motion to dismiss); Harrison v. Michigan, 350 F. Stipp. 846, 818 (E.D. Mich. 1972)
(failure to provide education for disabled students violates Equal Protection Clause).
" See H.R. REP. No. 94-332, at 2 (1975), cited in Rowley, 458 U.S. at 179.
45 See id.
See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 193.
17 See S. REP. No. 94-168, at 8 (1975); see also 120 CoNc. REC. 15,271 (1974) (stating that
Congress must ensure "education for all children which meets their unique needs"), died in
Timothy v. Rochester Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 954, 963 (1989).
48 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1990 & Supp. 1998). Congress recently amended the purpose of
the IDEA to read "improving educational results for children with disabilities is an essential
clement of our national policy of ensuring quality of opportunity, full participation, independent
living, and economic self sufficiency for individuals with disabilities." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(c). The
purpose of the IDEA, therefore, has been expanded to ensure a quality education for disabled
children, not merely equal educational opportunity. See id.
See S, REP. No. 94- 168, at 8 (1975); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1400(6).
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sibility.5° The statute requires that "all children residing in the state
who are disabled, regardless of the severity of their disability, and who
are in need of special education and related services are identified,
located, and evaluated, and that a practical method is developed and
implemented . . ."" Further, the law requires that state educational
plans must include procedures for the implementation and use of a
"comprehensive system of personnel development" which complies
with each student's individualized education plan.52 To accomplish this
objective, local educational agencies must develop, implement, regu-
larly review and revise an individual education plan for each disabled
The IDEA requires that all special education and related serv-
ices which conform with an individualized education plan must be
provided at public expense and supervision." States arc also responsi-
ble for assuring that disabled children arc educated with children who
are not disabled to the maximum extent appropriate. 55 Additionally,
the statute assures that children with disabilities in private schools and
facilities will be provided special education and related services by the
state in conformance with an individualized education program for
each child."
Compliance is ensured by permitting the withholding of federal
funds upon determination that a state or local educational district has
5° See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 183; see also 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412-1414.
51 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(C). Special education is defined by statute to mean all "specially
designed instruction, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a disabled
child, including instruction conducted in the classroom, in the home, in hospitals and institu-
tions, and in other settings." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16)(A).
52 See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(C); see also id. §§ 1401(a) (18) (defining "free appropriate
education"); 1401(a) (20) (defining "individualized education plan").
53 See id. § 1414(a) (5). An individualized education plan is defined by the statute as "a written
statement for each child with a disability developed in any meeting by a representative of the
local educational agency (regarding) specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs
of children with disabilities." Id. § 1401(a) (20). Such plan must include the specific educational
services to be provided, and the extent to which each child will be able to participate in regular
education programs. See id.
51 See id. § 1412. The IDEA defines related services as "transportation, and such developmen-
tal, corrective, and other supportive services (including speech pathology and audiology, psycho-
logical services, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, including therapeutic recreation,
social work services, counseling services, including rehabilitation counseling, and medical serv-
ices, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation purposes only) as
may be required to assist a child with a disability to benefit from special education, and includes
the early identification and assessment of disabling conditions in children." 20 U.S.C.
§ I401(a) (17).
55 See id. § 1412(5). The process of placing special education students with general education
students is colloquially known as "mainstreaming." See id.
56 See 20 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (4) (B).
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failed to satisfy the requirements of the IDEA. 57 The IDEA provides
federal grants to states; states, in turn, give money to local educational
agencies to help educate disabled students. 58 If a state electing to
participate in this system of IDEA grants fails to ensure a free appro-
priate public education for students with disabilities, the government
may withhold federal funds."
2. Judicial Interpretation of the IDEA Leads to Costly Measures
Although the statute itself mandates several specific obligations,
the United States Supreme Court has refined many of the current
requirements under the IDEA. 6° The United States Supreme Court and
lower federal courts have required local school districts to provide
expensive services to special education students by further refining
terms like "free appropriate education" and "related services."t't
57 See id § 1416(a); see also Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 183
(1982).
55 See 20U.S.C. § 1416(a).
See id.
re See, e.g., Florence County Sch. Dist. v. Shannon, 510 U.S. 7, 16-17 (1993) (school must
pay for private special education even if student was previously withdrawn from public system);
School Comm. of Burlington v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1985) (public school
districts must pay for private special education if such private placement is proper); Rowley, 458
U.S. at 203-04 (personalized special education must be provided at public expense and comply
with individual IEP). The requirements mandated in Burlington, 471 U.S. 359 (1985) have been
changed due to recent Congressional amendments to the IDEA. See IDEA Amendments of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 57 (1997). The IDEA Amendments of 1997 provide that public
school districts arc not required to pay for special education at private institutions if a free
appropriate public education was otherwise available. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (10) (A).
61 See supra note 60; see also Susquenita Sch. Dist. v. Raelee, 96 F.3d 78, 84 (3d Cir. 1996)
(school must pay for private school education during pendancy of litigation); Timothy v. Roch-
ester Sch. Dist., 875 F.2d 954, 972-73 (1st Cir. 1989) (school must pay for special education even
though student was severely retarded and did n o t show any benefit from the education); Crawford
v. Pittman, 708 F.2d 1028, 1035 (5th Cir. 1983) (school must provide special education during
the summer and lack of funds does not relieve school of this requirement); Ronkcr v. Walter, 700
F2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir, 1983) (schools must mainstream despite the difficult financial burden
imposed); Doe v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., No. G92-2863, 1993 WL 560704, at *9 (N.D. Cal.
1993) (public school district must pay for private residential treatment); Parks v. Pavkovic, 557 F.
Supp. 1280, 1287 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (statute which required parents of special education students
to pay for services conflicted with the EAI ICA, violating the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution); Campbell v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp. 47, 54-55 (N.D.
Ala. 1981) (student's 1EP violated the FAHCA because it did not mainstream him enough); Hines
v. Pitt County Bd. of Educ., 497 F. Supp. 403, 408 (E.D.N.C. 1980) (school could not refuse to
provide special education even though school could not afford to expend extraordinary funds
due to budget constraints). But see Samantha v. Rutherford County Sch., 68 F.3d 965, 973 (6th
Cir. 1995) (school does not have to pay for nurse to perform tracheostottay because it is medical
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In 1984, for example, the United States Supreme Court held in
Irving Independent School District v, Tatro that, in certain circumstances,
local school districts must provide private nurses for special education
students' individual needs." In Tatro, a special education student
sought to compel the school district to pay for a private nurse in order
to perform catheterization every three hours. 63 The Court reasoned
that this supportive service is required for a disabled child to benefit
from special education.°' The Court rejected the idea that providing a
private nurse was a medical service. 66 Thus, the Court held that local
school districts must provide private nurses for similarly situated special
education students."
Similarly, the United States Supreme Court in 1988 held in Honig
v. Doe that local school districts may not suspend or expel dangerous
or disruptive special education students if such behavior "grows out or
their disabilities." In Honig, a local school district expelled a special
education student because of disruptive and aggressive classroom be-
havior and an inability to conform to socially acceptable norms." The
Court reasoned, however, that Congress did not intend for special
education students to be removed from the classroom setting." The
Court noted that Congress passed the IDEA after finding that school
systems across the country had excluded one out of eight disabled
children from classes, often using disruptive behavior as a pretext for
exclusion. 70
 Therefore, the Court acknowledged that the statute re-
quires states to educate all disabled students regardless of the severity
of their disabilities. 7 ' Thus, the Court held that schools may not expel
or suspend dangerous or disruptive special education Auden 0. 72
expense excluded under IDEA); Granite Sch. Dist. v. Shannon, 787 F. Supp. 1020,1029-30 (D.
Utah 1992) (school does not have to pay for nurse to maintain feeding tube because it is too
financially burdensome, is a medical expenditure and mainstreaming cannot be achieved satis-
factorily).
62 468 U.S. 883,894-95 (1984).
63 See id. at 885.
64 See id. at 890.
65 See id. at 892. According to statute, states are not responsible for providing medical services
to special education students. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (17).
55 See Tram, 468 U.S. at 894.,
67 484 U.S. 305,308,322-24 (1988).
68 See id. at 306. Among other things, the special education student choked another student
and kicked out a window during class. See id. at 313.
69 See id. at 323.
76 See id. at 324.
71 See id.
72 See Honig, 484 U.S. at 325. The Court noted that there is a limited public safety exception.
See id. In cases where a student poses an immediate threat to herself or others, the student may
be temporarily suspended for up to ten school days. See id. The IDEA Amendments of 1997 affirm
the Court's decision in Honig. See IDEA Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111  Stat. 37
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These two cases illustrate just two of the many protections and
services judicially required pursuant to the IDEA." Among other re-
quirements, federal courts have also held that local schools must pay
for special education private school tuition, summer education and
home tutors. 71 Courts consistently have held that special education and
related services must be provided despite the greater expense incurred
by local school districts."
D. Stales Pass Special Education Statutes to Conform with the
Requirements of the Individuals with Dinar:* lilies Education Act
It is useful to examine the requirements of state special education
statutes enacted pursuant to IDEA requirements to better explain the
expenditures for special education." Most state special education laws
mirror the structure and provisions of the IDEA. 77 The state statutes,
however, implement IDEA requirements in greater detail. 78 Currently,
all fifty states have enacted special education statutes pursuant to the
federal requirements of the IDEA." Similarly, all fifty states currently
(1997). The IDEA now states that special education services must be provided to students who
have been expelled or suspended. See 20 U.S.C. § 14I2(a) (1) (A).
73 See supra notes 62,67.
74 See supra notes 60-61.
75 See, e.g., Mills, 348 F. Stipp. at 876; see also Raelee, 96 F.3d at 84 (school must pay for private
school education during pcndancy of litigation); Timothy, 875 F.2d at 972-73 (school must pay
for special education even though student was severely retarded and did not show any benefit
from the education); Crawford, 708 E2d at 1035 (school must provide special education during
the summer and lack of funds does not relieve school of this requirement); Ronker, 700 F.2d at
1063 (schools must mainstream despite the difficult financial burden imposed); Doe V. Berkeley
Unified Sch. Dist., 1993 WL 560704, at *9 (public school district must pay for private residential
treatment); Parks, 557 E Supp. at 1287 (statute which required parents of special education
students to pay for services conflicted with the EMICA, violating the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution); Campbel4 518 F. Supp. at 54-55 (student's IEP violated the FAHCA
because it did not mainstream him enough); Hines, 497 F. Supp. at 408 (school could not refuse
to provide special education even though school could not afford to expend extraordinary funds
due to budget constraints). But see Samantha, 68 F.3d at 973 (school does not have to pay for
nurse to perform uacheostonty because it is medical expense excluded under IDEA); Shannon,
787 F. Supp. at 1029-30 (school does not have to pay for nurse to maintain feeding tube because
it is too financially burdensome, is a medical expenditure and mainstreaming cannot be achieved
satisfactorily).
76 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-76 et seq. (1997); N.il. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186-C et seq.
(1989 & Supp. 1997); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 21-2-501 et seq. (Michic 1997).
77 Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1400 ct seq., with CONN, Cr.N STAT. § 10-76 et seq.; N.II. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 186-C et seq.; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 21-2-501 et seq.
76 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-76 et seq.; NIL Raw. STAT. ANN. § 186-C et seq.; Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 21-2-501 ct seq.
79 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-76 et seq.; N.1-1. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186—C et seq.; WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 21-2-501 et seq.
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receive some amount of federal funding pursuant to the IDEA. 8° This
part of the Note will discuss the special education statutes of three
representative states, New Hampshire, Connecticut and Wyoming, to
illustrate how state laws are enacted pursuant to the IDEA require-
ments. 81
For example, in New Hampshire, the purpose of the state special
education law is to provide all children with equal educational oppor-
tunities." The law requires that each child in need of special education
be entitled to attend an approved program capable of implementing
the child's individualized education plan." The state statute, further-
more, requires local school districts to provide services which are
related to any educational objectives in the disabled child's individual-
ized education plan.84 Local school districts must pay all expenses
incurred in order to implement the provisions of an individualized
education plan. 85 In this respect, the New Hampshire special education
statute mirrors the provisions of the IDEA. 8°
Similarly, the Connecticut special education statute requires local
districts to provide special education for any exceptional child. 87 The
law calls for individualized education plans which must include a
statement of all necessary services for a child requiring special educa-
tion.88
 The state statute also requires local communities to pay for
transportation, tuition, room, board and other items necessary as out-
lined in the individualized education plan. 89 The Connecticut special
education statute, like New Hampshire's, follows the requirements of
the IDEA.°
The Wyoming special education statute, similarly, follows the re-
quirements set forth in the IDEA. 9 ' The law requires that every child
8° See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-76 et seq.; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186-C et seq.; WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 21-2-501 et seq.
91 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-76 et seq.; N.II. REV. STAT. A. § 186-C et seq.; WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 21-2-501 et seq. I have chosen to use these state statutes as representatives because
they are used later in the Note as examples which discuss state equal protection analysis. See infra
notes 131-251 and accompanying text.
82 See Ni Rtv. STAT, ANN. § 186-C:1.
E See id. § 186-C:9.
84 See id. § 186-C:9-a.
85 See id. § 186-C:13.
96 Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 186-C et seq., with 20U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
87 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-76d(b). The state law defines an exceptional child as "0/1C who
has mental retardation, a physical handicap, neurological impairment, or who is autistic, trau-
matically brain injured, seriously emotionally disturbed, [or suffering from a learning disability]
which impedes the child's rate of development." See id. § 10-76a(5).
se See id. § 10-76d(a)(10).
89 See id. § 10-76d(e)(1).
9° Compare CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-76 et seq., with 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
9t See Wiro, STAT. ANN. § 21-2-501 et seq.
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in the state with a mental, physical or psychological disability which
impairs learning is entitled to and must receive a free and appropriate
education." The statute mandates that the local school districts must.
provide for the diagnosis, evaluation, education, training and related
services for each student." Related services for special education in-
clude, but are not limited to, room and board. 94
 The statutes of these
three states are representative of virtually all fifty states; they conform
to the requirements of the IDEA."
II. SPECIAL EDUCATION MANDATES DIRECTLY REDUCE 'rilE QUALITY
OF GENERAL EDUCATION SERVICES PROVIDED
This part of the Note demonstrates that special education man-
dates are directly related to a reduction in the educational quality and
services provided to general education students. Together, the follow-
ing five reasons effectively illustrate that special education mandates
reduce the services provided to general education students. First, the
fact that funding for per pupil expenditures relates directly to the
educational services provided demonstrates that providing more fund-
ing to special education leads to less funding for general education."
Second, most local school districts operating under fixed lax levy
budgets show that the additional funds provided to special education
comes at a cost to general education students. 97 Third, special educa-
tion mandates arc costly because: (a) expenditures arc required by
judicial decisions as discussed above; (b) the cost of special education
is not a limiting factor under the IDEA; (c) more students than in-
tended arc classified as special education students; (d) more services
than intended are provided under individualized education plans; and
(c) local school districts are afraid to challenge both students classified
as special education or services required under individualized educa-
tion plans because of the high costs of IDEA litigation.• Fourth, the
lack of federal funding creates a situation in which the state must fund
special education to the detriment of general education." Fifth, the
lack of a similar requirement under the law to mandate local schools
to provide services for general education students leads to the reduc-
92 See id. § 21-2-501.
93 See id. § 21-2-502.
91 See id.
95 Compare WYO. STAT. ANN. § 21-2-501 et seq., with 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
99 See infra text accompanying notes 102-04.
97 See infra text accompanying notes 105-07.
99 See infra text accompanying notes 108-22.
" See infra tcxt accompanying notes 123-25.
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tion of services provided to general education students.m° Finally, a test
case is provided to illustrate the actual effects upon a general education
student. 10 '
A. Funding is Directly Related to the Level of Educational Services
Provided
The approach advocated here is premised on the fact that special
education mandates create disparities in per pupil expenditures, de-
crease the amount of funding and infringe upon the educational
opportunity of general education pupils. Thus, it is necessary to estab-
lish that differences in per pupil expenditures are directly related to
the amount of educational, services and the quality of education re-
ceived by a student. First, professional educators consistently acknow-
ledge that changes in per pupil expenditures relate directly to educa-
tion quality and services. 1 °2 Administrators and educators realize that
expenditures translate directly into student-teacher ratios, equipment
purchases and extracurricular activities. 103 Additionally, courts wres-
tling with the issue of education finance have taken judicial notice of
the fact that disparities in per pupil expenditures relate directly to the
quality and availability of educational services. 104
B. School Budgets are Generally Fixed
Furthermore, the notion that special education mandates directly
cause reductions to general education spending is based on the fact
that nationwide, virtually all school districts operate with fixed budg-
ets. 105 Most local school districts are funded through local budgets with
money appropriated from an annual taxlevy. 1 °6 Therefore, the budgets
1(1° See infra text accompanying notes 126-29.
191 See infra text accompanying note 130.
192 See, e.g., Zernike, Mar. 30, 1991 supra note II, at Al; see also .supra note 24.
193 See, e.g., Zernike, Mar. 30, 1997, supra note 11, at Al; see also supra note 24.
104 See, e.g., infra 185-87, 236-37, 248-49 and accompanying text. Although commentators
do not uniformly agree that funding has a linear relationship with the quality of education, courts
have nevertheless taken judicial notice that a lack of funding causes a reduction in educational
services which is directly related to the overall quality of education. See infra 185-87, 236-37,
248-49 and accompanying text. The dissent in San Antonio Independent School District V. Rodriguez
stated that a difference in available funds results in a difference in educational quality available
for a student's public education. 411 U.S. I, 85 (1973) (Marshall, Douglas,.[]., dissenting). Various
state supreme courts also recognize that students receiving a lesser per pupil expenditure receive
an education that is a "substantial degree lower in both breadth and quality" than those receiving
higher per pupil expenditures. See, e.g., Washakic County Sch. Dist. v. I lerschler, 606 P.2d 310,
334 (Wyo. 1980); Morton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (Conn. 1977).
195 See, e.g., Frerking, supra note 24, at A6.
196 See, e.g., Zernike, Mar. 30, 1997, supra now 11, at Al. Sonic communities, however, have
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of most local school districts are fixed each year by community school
boards or city councils.m Thus, local school districts operate unlike
most businesses; if money is expended on one part of the school
budget, it must be detracted from another.
C. The Reasons Why Special Education Mandates are Costly
1. State Law is Enacted Pursuant to the IDEA
Having established that per pupil expenditures relate directly to
education quality and services, and recognizing that local school budg-
ets arc fixed, it is easier to understand how special education mandates
flowing from the IDEA directly affect general education students."
Even though special education law is defined by state statute, such
statutes are enacted pursuant to the minimum federal requirements of
the IDEA.' 09 Thus, local school districts arc required to provide most
types of private care, residential placement, tuition reimbursement,
summer classes and the costs of mainstreaming for a special education
student.u° As articulated earlier, the majority of IDEA cases have im-
posed costly requirements on local school districts."' Under the IDEA,
therefore, the courts have consistently held that school districts must
provide expensive special education services to disabled children.m
2. The Cost of Providing Special Education is Not Presently a
Factor to be Considered by Courts
As discussed above, courts have emphasized that school budget
limitations and lack of funding do not relieve school districts of their
obligations under the IDEA."' As in Mills, courts have reasoned that
allowing a school to provide less funding than required by each stu-
dent's individualized education plan is a violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the United States Constitution.'" As a result of the IDEA
instituted Lax levy overrides, in which the overall school budget may be increased by raising the
property tax of the community as a whole. See id. This option is rarely, if ever, used to supplement
local school budgets. See id.
107 See id.
100 See supra text accompanying notes 105-07.
109 Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., with CONN. GF.N. STAT. § 10-76 et seq.; N.H. REV, STAT.
ANN. § 186-C et seq.; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 21-2-501 et seq. The IDEA does not require states to
enact legislation which conforms to its requirements unless the state wishes to receive funding;
all states, however, receive such federal grants. See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
"° See supra notes 60-61.
111 See supra notes 60-61.
112 See supra notes 60-61.
113 See, e.g., Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866,876 (D.D.C. 1972).
" 4 See id.
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and its strict judicial interpretation, local school districts have been
required under state and federal law to provide every expense required
to satisfy each student's individualized education plan. 115
3. More Students and Services arc Classified as Special Education;
Schools Fear Challenging Individualized Education Plans
Special education mandates also require more funding because
an increased number of students arc classified as requiring special
education." 6 Even Congress recognizes that special education laws arc
interpreted much too broadly." 7 Some commentators acknowledge
that nearly eighty percent of special education students were not in-
tended to be protected under special education statutes." Addition-
ally, critics charge that special education statutes provide services that
are unnecessary for the education of students." 9 Furthermore, most
local school districts choose to pay for the increased special education
costs rather than challenge an individualized education plan in court
because litigation expenses are even more costly.' 2° School districts are
further inhibited from challenging these costs because the IDEA re-
quires them to pay for the student's legal fees if the student prevails.' 2 I
It is no wonder, therefore, that in ninety-five percent of cases, school
districts settle with special education students before the cases even get
to the hearing stage. 122
D. Federal Funding Accounts for Less Than Ten Percent of Special
Education Costs
Special education costs cause further problems because they are
funded primarily by local municipalities.'" When the IDEA was en-
acted, the federal government proposed that it would contribute forty
1* See supra notes 60-61.
"6 See, e.g., Zernike, Mar. 30, 1997, supra note 11, at Al. The IDEA Amendments of 1997,
in fact, broadened the classification of special education students. See IDEA Amendments of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-17,111 Stat. 37 (1997). The term "disability" may now include children who arc
merely experiencing "developmental delays" in physical, cognitive. communication, social, emo-
tional, or adaptive development. See 20 U.S.C. § 1402(3). The IDEA, after the Amendments of
1997, specifically states that special education services must also be provided to students who have
been suspended or expelled. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a) ( I) (A),
111 See 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a) (1) (A); see also II.R.Rep. No. 105-95, at 89 ("Today, the growing
problem is over identifying children with disabilities when they might not be truly disabled."),.
ug See 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (a) (1) (A).
119 See, e.g., Finneran Critical of Special Ed Costs, supra note 24, at B8.
I" See, e.g., Zernike, Mar. 30,1997, supra note 11, at Al.
121 See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (4).
122 See, e.g., Zernikc, Mar. 30,1997, supra note II, at Al.
123 See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
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percent of the funding needed to cover all required expenditures. 124
The federal government, however, contributes only seven percent of
the required costs nationwide, while the remainder of all special edu-
cation expenditures falls upon states and local school districts.' 25
E. No Similar Mandate for General Education Students
Finally, schools arc not required by law to provide any specific level
of funding for general education students.' 26 Thus, the IDEA and state
special education statutes effectively require local school districts to
fund special education before they can fund general education. The
resulting increases in special education costs are effectively siphoned
from general education spending because local school districts across
the country have fixed budgets constrained by annual tax levy
amounts: 27 Moreover, reductions in funding to general education bud-
gets have been widely recognized by courts and educators to translate
to reductions in educational services such as teachers, supplies and
other educationally related services: 28 Although Congress intended to
provide educational access and opportunity to disabled students, leg-
islative history makes it clear that Congress did not intend money to
be siphoned from general education to special education: 29
F. A Sample Scenario
The full effect of special education mandates on general educa-
tion students is better appreciated by examining a "test" student.' 3°
Consider the plight of a general education student who lives in Any-
town, U.S.A. and attends Anytown Central High School, The high
school has registered 1000 students for each of the past ten years. This
year, 100 students are registered as students deserving special educa-
tion arid have submitted individualized education plans to the Anytown
124 See 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (a).
155 See Markoc, supra note 15, at 01. The recent IDEA Amendments of 1997 at least acknow-
ledge that funding is a problem. See IDEA Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat.
57 (1997). The IDEA "funding formula" now accounts fur each state's poverty rate. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1411(c), At the same time, however; Congress placed a federal funding cap on IDEA grants,
See id. IDEA annual grants to states may not exceed 1.5% of the prior year's funding. See id.
120 compare 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (IDEA), with 20 U.S.C. (education generally).
" See supra text accompanying notes 105-08.
12° See supra text accompanying notes 102-04.
129 See supra text accompanying notes 96-47; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1100(c); S. REP. No. 94-168
(noting that local and state financial resources were inadequate, and that an intent of the EMMA
was to "relieve the fiscal burden placed on the States and localities").
15°The following scenario is a realistic model based upon the national statistics discussed
above. See supra text accompanying notes 1-24.
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School Board. Ten years ago, only fifty students were registered as
special education students. For each of the past ten years, the budget
of Anytown Central High School has remained constant at $5 million
(all monetary figures are real and discounted for inflation). This year,
the school has allocated $3.75 million for general education expenses
and $1.25 million for special education expenses. The high school
reports to the state that its per pupil expenditure is $5000 per student.
The school spends, however, an average of $4167 per pupil for general
education students and $12,500 per pupil for special education stu-
dents.
Additionally, in order to comply with new judicial mandates and
individualized education plans of special education students, the high
school has been forced to increase its special education budget and
reduce its general education budget approximately two percent for
each of the past ten years. That is, five years ago, the school allocated
approximately $4.5 million for general education and $500,000 for
special education. Thus, ten years ago, the high school spent approxi-
mately $4700 per pupil for general education students and $10,000 per
pupil for special education students.
Over the past ten years, $750,000 has been diverted from general
education to special education expenses. Ten years ago, Anytown Cen-
tral High School employed thirty-eight general education teachers to
maintain a student-teacher ratio of 25:1 and appropriated $1.5 million
for general education teaching staff. Today, after receiving a propor-
tional share of the cuts, $1.25 million is appropriated for general
education teaching staff. As a result, during the past ten years, Anytown
Central High School has been forced to fire seven general education
teachers. The general education student-teacher ratio has grown to
approximately 30:1. Moreover, the school has been forced to decrease
all other portions of the general education budget, including, but not
limited to new supplies, computing facilities and extracurricular op-
portunities.
M. AN OVERVIEW OF EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES AND
EDUCATION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT UNDER THE UNITED STATES
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
A. Brief History of Constitutional Equal Protection Analysis
What legal recourse does a general education student have? Al-
though there are several avenues by which a general education student
could challenge the disparities in education financing, this part of the
Note posits that such infringements constitute violations of general
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education students' equal protection guarantees."" Having been left
without other recourse, the general education student must now turn
to the United States and state constitutions in order to determine if
this deprivation of educational services amounts to a constitutional
deprivation of equal protection."' The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires
that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." 1 "3 The Amendment, although drafted in the
context of post-Civil War efforts to eliminate laws which sanctioned
slavery, was written with general language, rather than words that focus
on race.'" Because of this language, the scope of the Equal Protection
Clause was expanded by courts beyond merely race to require that all
legislative classifications be based upon some reasonable ground and
not mere arbitrary selectio ► ."5
1. Equal Protection Standards and the Tiered Analysis
The United States Supreme Court developed a tiered analytical
framework for scrutinizing challenges under the Equal Protection
Clause."6 The Court first suggested that a stricter standard of scrutiny
should apply to legislation that restricts those political processes which
can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legis-
lation or statutes directed at particular religious, national, or racial
minorities.'" The Court, currently employs two primary techniques
when reviewing statutes under equal protection challenges: (1) the
rational basis test and (2) judicial strict scrutiny.'"
131 See infra text accompanying notes 132-320. This Note declines to conduct an analysis
based on the Due Process clauses of the federal and state constitutions. See, e.g., U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1. This Note also declines to offer a remedy under the Unfunded Mandates Worm
Act (UMRA), 2 U.S,C. § 1501 ct seq. It is useful, however, to observe that Congress recognised
substantial problems with unfunded federal statutes. See id. § 1501(2). Congress enacted the
UMRA in 1995 to end the imposition of federal mandates on local governments without adequate
federal funding, as these impositions curtail essential local services. See id, § 1513(a). The IDEA,
however, is exempt from the provisions of the UMRA because it enforces a statutory right
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of handicap and disability. See id. § 1503(2).
132 See infra text accompanying notes 133.-320.
U .S. CoN.s .r. amend, XIV, § 1.
' 34
 See id.; see also CHESTER JAMES ANT1E:AU & WILLIAM J. RICO, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL
Lin/ 3-9 (1997).
135 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36,54,71-72,81 (1872) (noting a distinction between
racial discrimination and economic regulation and the applicability of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to non-racial legislation).
1311 See, e.g., United States v. Carolenc Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,153 & n,4 (1938).
137 See id. at 153 n.4.
138 See ANTIKAu & Rim], supra note 131, at 3-9. The Court has more recently established a
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a. Rational Basis Test
The rational basis test is the lowest standard of judicial review for
an equal protection challenge.' 39 Using this level of judicial review,
courts will not deem a statute unconstitutional as long as there is some
rational relation between a legitimate state objective and the means
selected by the legislature in the state statute.'" Thus, a law will not be
stricken unless it is purely arbitrary.' 4 ' As long as the legislature could
rationally have decided that a statute would meet a conceivable state
objective, it will be deemed constitutional.'"
b. Judicial Strict Scrutiny
Courts may also apply judicial strict scrutiny.'" When courts apply
strict scrutiny, a statute is deemed unconstitutional unless it is abso-
lutely necessary for a compelling state purpose, and is drafted narrowly
with no less burdensome alternative." 4 Moreover, under strict scrutiny,
the state has the burden of proving that the statute is narrowly tailored
to meet the compelling state interest.'" Thus, courts have noted that
judicial strict scrutiny analysis is nearly always fatal for statutes chal-
lenged under the Equal Protection Clause.'"
The strict scrutiny test is generally applied in only two cases: ( I) if
the statute is based upon a suspect classification, or (2) if the statute
impairs a fundamental right. If strict scrutiny is not applicable, the
court defaults to the rational basis test." 7 The Supreme Court thus far
has recognized only race, religion and national origin as suspect classes
which trigger strict scrutiny.'" In addition to these suspect classes, the
middle level standard of review, often called heightened scrutiny. See id. at 121-23. This standard,
for example, is generally applied in cases involving gender. See id.
139 See id. at 3-9.
140 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470-71 (1991); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S.
221, 230, 234 (1981); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co„ 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981); Lindsley
v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
141 See, e.g., Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470-71; Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 230, 234; Clover Leaf 449 U.S.
at 464; Lindsley, 220 U.S, at 78-79.
142 See, e.g., Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470-71; Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 230, 234; Clover Leaf 449 U.S.
at 464; Lindsley, 220 U.S. at 78-79.
143 See ANTIEAll & RICH, supra note 134, at 3-9.
144 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995); Adarand Constructors, lime. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 227, 235 (1995); City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Cis., 473 U.S. 432, 440
(1985); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984).
143 See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 904; Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227, 235; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440;
Bernal, 467 U.S. at 219.
143 See, e.g., Bernal, 467 U.S. at 220 11.6.
147 See A.r.rriEAu & Rice, supra note 130, at 3-9.
145 See, e.g., Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440. The Court recognized gender as a class which receives
special consideration and utilizes a middle level of scrutiny for this analysis. See supra note 138.
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Court has recognized that certain interests arc "fundamental," and
deserve a heightened level of protection under the Equal Protection
Clause.'" For example, the Court has held that the rights to marry,
procreate, vote, access the judicial system and travel arc fundamental
rights.' 50 If a statute infringes upon the exercise of one these funda-
mental rights, then the Court will apply judicial strict scrutiny.'" Al-
though a general education student is not a member of a protected
class, education is sometimes deemed a "fundamental right". An equal
protection challenge may succeed, therefore, because special educa-
tion infringes upon general education services. 152
B. Brief History of Education as a Fundamental Right Under the United
States Constitution
1. Brown v. Board of Education and the Importance of Education
In 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education, the United States Supreme
Court held that the "separate but equal" segregation of children in
public schools solely on the basis of race deprived minority children
of equal educational opportunities and equal protection of the laws.' 53
In so ruling, the Supreme Court discussed the importance of educa-
tion.'" The Court stated that it must consider public education in light
of its full development and its present place in society.' 55
 In what has
become frequently-cited language, the Court stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance
laws and the great expenditures for education both demon-
strate our recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society. It is required in the performance of our
most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed
forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it
is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training, and
1 " ANTJEAu Rim', supra note 134, at 6.
15° See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 650, 634 (1969) (holding right to travel
fundamental); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 665, 666-67 (1966) (holding
right to vote fundamental); Skinner v. Oklahoma cx rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(holding right to marry and procreate fundamental).
151 See ANT1TEAU & RICH, supra note 134, at 6-7, 12.
152 See infra text accompanying notes 153-320.
I " See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 193-95 (1954).
154 See id. at 493.
15 See id. at 492-93,
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a.
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In
these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of
an education. Such an opportunity, where the state has un-
dertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available
to all on equal terms.'"
2. The Supreme Court Narrowly Fails to Hold that Education is a
Fundamental Right
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez: The
Majority
In 1973, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, the
United States Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision held that a Texas
education finance scheme, which caused funding disparities between
local communities, was constitudonal.' 57 In a decision authored by
Justice Powell, the Court did not reach the conclusion that there is a
fundamental right to education under the United States Constitution
for purposes of equal protection analysis.'" Therefore, the Court did
not apply judicial strict scrutiny when analyzing the state education
finance scheme.'" The Court concluded that the state plan rationally
furthered a legitimate state interest. 160
In Rodriguez, local school districts and public school students
claimed that the Texas system of financing public education violated
the Equal Protection Clause because it relied on local property taxes. 161
Districts with a high property tax base spent more on education than
those with a low property tax base.'" The Court chose not to apply
judicial strict scrutiny because the state action did not burden a fun-
damental right.' 63 In deciding what rights arc fundamental, the Court
136 /d, at 493. Although the Court in Brown failed to reach the issue of education as a
fundamental right, this language is often cited by courts declaring education as a fundamental
right for equal protection purposes. See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359,372 (1977) (citing
language in Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
167 411 U.S. 1,37-38 (1973).
168
 See id.
169 See id. at 39.
166
 See id. at 55.
161 See id. at 1-8.
162 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 7-9. The court noted that education spending ranged frdra
approximately $305 per pupil in sonic districts to $815 per pupil in others. See id. at 15-16.
165 See id. at 40. The Court considered and rejected two possible applications of judicial strict
scrutiny to the state education finance scheme. See id. This article does not discuss the Court's
rejection of wealth as a suspect classification. See id. at 28-29.
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stated that the importance of a service is not a determining factor.' 64
The Court assessed whether there is a right to education explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the United States Constitution.' 96 Thus, the
Court in Rodriguez, while acknowledging that education is extremely
important to society, reasoned that because the right is neither explic-
itly nor implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, it is not fun damen-
tatt66
Additionally, the Court reasoned that judicial strict scrutiny was
not appropriate because regulation of education was traditionally a
power reserved for the states.' 67 The Court was apprehensive of impos-
ing a rigorous standard of scrutiny which would affect all local fiscal
schemes under the United States Constitution.' 66 Specifically, the Court
realized that the potential impact of Rodriguez on the system of feder-
alism was great and could possibly abrogate systems of public education
in virtually every state.' 69 The Court also speculated that to declare an
education funding system based on local taxes unconstitutional may
lead to the impermissibility of other local services such as police and
fire protection. 17° It upheld the constitutionality of the education fi-
nance scheme, even though it created a disparity in education per
pupil expenditures, because it was rationally related to a legitimate
state interest.' 71
b. The Rodriguez Dissent
The Rodriguez dissent advanced many arguments why education
should have been recognized as a fundamental right under the United
States Constitution. The dissent argued that considering a right to be
fundamental is not dependent on it being implicitly or explicitly guar-
anteed by the Constitution. 172 The dissent noted that the Court has
recognized a number of rights as fundamental, even where those rights
are not implicitly or explicitly found in the Constitution.' 73 Specifically,
the dissent observed that the right to travel, the right to procreate, the
164 See id. at ao,
165 See id. at 35.
166 See id. at 29 (citing Brown, 347 U.S. at 493).
167 see Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40.
166 See id. at 41.
169 See id. at 44.
170 See id. at 54.
171 See id. at 55.
172 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 62 (13rennan, J., dissenting), 98-99 (Marshall, Douglas,
dissenting).
173 See id. at 99. (Marshall, Douglasji., dissenting).
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right to criminal appeal and the right to vote have each been recog-
nized by the Court as fundamental, but are nowhere mentioned in the
Constitution.'" The dissent reasoned that the "fundamentality" of a
right is a function of the right's importance to effectuate a constitu-
tionally guaranteed right.'"
Therefore, as the nexus between an explicitly or implicitly guar-
anteed right and another interest tightens, the interest becomes fun-
damental, and a more rigorous degree of judicial scrutiny must be
applied when analyzing infringements of that right.'" The dissent
further reasoned that education is inextricably linked to, and is a
necessary component for, participation in the voting process. 177 Addi-
tionally, the dissent noted that education is necessary in order to
participate in the marketplace of free ideas guaranteed by the First
Amendment and the political process of our government.'" Thus, the
dissent reasoned that education is a fundamental right because it is
necessary to effectuate these other constitutional guarantees.'" The
dissent observed that the pivotal position of education to success in
American society lends it an importance that is undeniable.' 8°
Furthermore, the dissent criticized the Rodriguez decision because
it allows unequal, invidious discrimination to occur as long as it is in
furtherance of a permissible state goal. 181 The dissent recognized that
the decision was an abrupt departure from prior state and federal
education finance equal protection decisions. 182 The dissent acknow-
ledged that substantial disparities in per pupil expenditures pro-
duced a discriminatory impact on schoolchildren.'" The dissent fur-
ther noted that a difference in available funds directly results in a
difference in educational quality available for a student's public edu-
cation.' 84
Additionally, the dissent stated that it. was the stark differences in
the treatment of schoolchildren, not a minimum absolute amount
allocated that is the crux of an equal protection challenge.'" The
dissent refuted the notion that the Constitution guarantees only some
171 See id. at 99-101 (Marshall, Douglas, jj., dissenting).
175 /d, at 62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
176 See id, at 62-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
' 71
 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 63 (Brennan, J., dissenting),
178 See id. at 63 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 113-14 (Marshall, Douglas, 11., dissenting).
179 See id. at 62-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
189 See id. at 113 (Marshall, Douglas, .U., dissenting).
Igi See id. at 68 (White, Douglas, Brennan, jj., dissenting).
182 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 70-71 (Marshall, Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
185 See id. at 72 (Marshall, Douglas, 11., dissenting).
1&1
	 id. at 85 (Marshall, Douglas, jJ., dissenting).
185 See id. at 82 (Marshall, Douglas, ..11., dissenting),
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level of educational adequacy.' 86 The dissent asserted that once a state
has established public education for its citizens, any finance scheme
which provides some students with less resources than others is dis-
criminatory.LB/ Finally, the dissent disagreed with the majority's asser-
tion that cases of education finance disparity are similar to cases in-
volving commercial economic disparity.' 88 Because such cases are
generally not analyzed using judicial strict scrutiny, the dissent rea-
soned that the constitutional importance of the interest and the invidi-
ousness of the discrimination arc ignored)"
3. The Supreme Court Leaves Room for Argument in Plyler v. Doe
In 1982, the United States Supreme Court carved out an excep-
tion to Rodriguez in Plyler v. Doe.'" In Plyler, the Court applied a
heightened level of judicial scrutiny to invalidate a state law which
prohibited illegal aliens from receiving an education."' Although the
Court acknowledged Rodriguez by stating that education had not been
deemed a fundamental right, it nevertheless noted that education is
more than a governmental benefit indistinguishable from other forms
of social welfare legislation.' 92 The Court reasoned that the importance
of education in maintaining our basic institutions and the lasting
impact of its deprivation on the life of a child mark the distinction)"
The Court in Plyler noted that education is of supreme impor-
tance, is vital for the preservation of a democratic system of govern-
ment and is fundamental to maintaining the fabric of our society."'
Additionally, the Court acknowledged its language in Brown that edu-
cation is the most important function of state and local governments
and the great expenditures for education demonstrate our recognition
of this importance)" Thus, the Court applied a heightened level of
scrutiny and not the rational basis test to invalidate a Texas law which
denied education to illegal immigrants.m
188 See id. at 90 (Marshall, Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
187 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 92 (Marshall, Douglas,,(]., dissenting).
I" See id. at 110 (Marshall, Douglas, II., dissenting).
189 See id. (Marshall, Douglas,Jl., dissenting).
190 457 U.S. 202,228-24 (1982).
191 See id. at 224.
192 See id. at 221.
195 See id.
194 See id.
195'
	 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222-23.
196 See id. at 224. Although the strict scrutiny standard was not used, the heightened standard
required that the state must, show that the statute was necessary to further a substantial state
interest. See id.
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C. Brief History of Education as a Fundamental Right Under State
Constitutions and Three Examples
It. appears that neither state nor federal courts have ruled on the
issue of whether special education laws violate general education stu-
dents' equal protection rights.' 97 The closest analogue is a line of cases
concerned with the constitutionality of state education finance
schemes. 198 Over the past twenty-five years, seventeen of the thirty-four
states facing education finance challenges have struck down education
finance statutes because they violated provisions of their state consti-
tutions.' 99 It should be noted that every state constitution grants a right
to an education. 21x' In cases where state courts held that education fi-
nance statutes were unconstitutional, the factual issue involved wealthy
school districts spending more per pupil than poor school districts. 20 '
Although the analysis is slightly different in the case at hand, many
state courts which have struck down education finance statutes have
held that education is a fundamental right under their state constitu-
tions. 2" 2
 Additionally, many of those state courts have applied judicial
strict scrutiny to analyze violations of equal protection. 2°3
197 Numerous Westlaw and Lcxis searches have produced no caselaw on this matter. Addi-
tionally, legal periodical searches have produced no articles concerning this argument.
190 See, e.g., Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997); Abbott v. Burke,
710 A.2d 450 (NJ. 1998) revising decision of 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997); DeRolph v. State, 677
N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997); Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997); Roosevelt Elementary Sch.
Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806 (Ariz. 1994); Alabama Coalition for Equity v, Hunt, 624 So.
2d 107 (Ala. 1993); McDuffy v. Secretary of Executive Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass.
1993); Tennessee Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1993); Rose v. Council for
Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d
684 (Mont. 1989); Edgcwood lnclep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Dupree v.
Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler,
606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va, 1979); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1
v. State, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977); Serrano v.
Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976).
199 See generally Claremont, 703 A.2d 1353; Abbott, 710 A.2d 450; DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d 733;
Brigham, 692 A.2d 384; Roosevelt, 877 P.2d 806; Alabama Coalition, 624 So. 2d 107; McDufb, 615
N.E.2d 516; McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139; Rose, 790 S.W.2d 186; Helena, 769 P.2d 684; Edgewood,
777 S.W.2d 391; Dupree, 651 S.W.2d 90; Washakie, 606 P.2d 310; Pauley, 255 S.E.2d 859; Seattle,
585 P.2d 71; Horton, 376 A.2d 359; Serrano, 557 P.2d 929.
2°0 See, e.g., CONN. CONST, art. 8, §§ 1-4; Nil. CoNsT. pt. II, art. 83; WYO. CONST. art. 7,
§§ 1-12.
201 See, e.g., infra notes 213, 228-29, 242 and accompanying text.
202 See, e.g., Claremont, 703 A.2d at 1359; DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 747, 776; Brigham, 692 A.2d
at 396; Roosevelt, 877 P.2d at 238, 242, 244; Alabama Coalition, 624 Su. 2d at 147, 151, 156-57;
Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299, 315 (Minn. 1993); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 579 (Wis.
1989); Washakie, 606 P.2d at 333; Pauley, 255 S.E.2d at 679; Horton, 376 A.2d at 646; Serrano, 557
P.2d at 766; see also Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 256 (N.D. 1994)
(holding statute constitutional although deciding education is fundamental right and applying
strict scrutiny); Scott v. Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994) (same).
203 See, e.g., Claremont, 703 A.2d at 1359; DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 747, 776; Roosevelt, 877 P.2d
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Of the nineteen states which have decided whether education is
a fundamental right for purposes of education funding inequities,
thirteen states have said that it is. 26' Six states, however, have held that
education is not a fundamental right for equal protection purposes.206
Of the thirteen states which have held that education is a fundamental
right for equal protection purposes, eleven states have held that judi-
cial strict scrutiny should apply when analyzing education funding
disparities. 2U 6 The other two states have held that even though strict
scrutiny is the normal test for an infringement of a fundamental right,
where financial inequalities exist, the court will use the rational basis
test. 207
Finally, of the eleven states which have applied strict scrutiny equal
protection analysis to state education finance statutes, eight of them
have struck down the schemes as unconstitutional. 208 The Note will
analyze the equal protection claim of a general education student
under state constitutions where education has been deemed a funda-
mental right in the representative states of Ncw Hampshire, Connecti-
cut and Wyoming. 209 It is necessary to examine the states that have held
that education is a fundamental right.
at 238, 242, 244; Bismarck, 511 N.W.2d at 259; Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 386; Alabama Coalition, 624
So, 2d at 147, 151, 156-57; Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 315; Washakie, 606 P.2d at 333; Pauley, 255 S,E.2d
at 679; Horton, 376 A.2d at 646; Serrano, 557 P.2d at 766.
"4 See, e.g., Claremont, 703 A.2d at 1359; Dellolph, 677 N,E.2d at 747, 776; Brigham, 692 A.2d
at 396; Roosevelt, 877 P.2d at 238, 242, 244; Alabama Coalition, 624 So. 2d at 147, 151, 156-57;
Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 315; Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 579; Washakie, 606 P.2d at 333; Pauley, 255 S.E.2d
at 679; Horton, 376 A,2d at 646; Serrano, 557 P.2d at 766; see also Bismarck, 511 N.W.2d at 256
(holding statute constitutional although deciding education is fundamental right and applying
strict scrutiny); Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 142 (same).
2135 See, e.g., Idaho Sch. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 850 P.2d 724, 733 (Idaho 1993);
East Jackson Pub. Sch. v. State, 348 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Mich. 1984); Hornbeck v. Somerset County
Rd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 786 (Md. 1983); Lujan v. Colorado State Rd, of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, ,
1018 (Colo. 1982); Board of Educ., Levittown Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Nyquist, 439 N.E.2d 359,
366 (N.Y. 1982); Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 144-45 (Or. 1976).
"6 See, e.g., Claremont, 703 A.2d at 1359; DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 747, 776; Brigham, 692 A.2d
at 596; Roosevelt, 877 P.2d at 238, 242, 244; Alabama Coalition, 624 So. 2d at 147, 151, 156-57;
Skeen 505 N.W.2d at 315; Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 579; Washakie, 606 P.2d at 333; Pauley, 255 S,E.2d
at 679; Horton, 376 A,2d at 646; Serrano, 557 P.2d at 766; see also Bismarck, 511 N.W.2d at 256;
Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 142. States generally employ the same equal protection analysis employed by
the United States Supreme Court and the federal court system.
207 See, e.g., Brigham, 692 A.2d at 397; Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 580.
208 See, e.g., Claremont, 703 A.2d at 1359; DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 776; Roosevelt, 877 P.2d at
242, 244; Alabama Coalition, 624 So. 2d at 151, 156-57; Washakie, 606 P.2d at 333; Pauley, 255
S.E.2d at 679; Horton, 376 A.2d at 646; Serrano, 557 P.2d at 766.
"g See generally Claremont, 703 A.2d 1353 (N.H. 1997); Washakie, 606 P.2d 310 (Wyo. 1980);
Horton, 376 A.2d 359 (Conn. 1977). The three states were chosen to provide a summary of
analysis regarding states that have held that education is a fundamental right.
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1. New Hampshire
In 1997, in Claremont School District v. Governor of New Hampshire,
the Ncw Hampshire Supreme Court held that the state system of
financing public education was unconstitutional under the state con-
stitution. 21° In Claremont, a local school district sought a declaratory
judgment stating that education is a fundamental right in the state of
New Hampshire. 2 " The court determined that education is a funda-
mental right and that the cause of any education funding disparity
must be examined with judicial strict scrutiny. 212 In arriving at this
decision, the court ' focused both on constitutional interpretation and
"common sense." 215
First, the Claremont court noted that public education differs from
all other services of the state. 214 Furthermore, the court reasoned that
no other governmental service plays such a seminal role in developing
and maintaining a citizenry capable of furthering the economic, po-
litical and social viability of the state. 215 The court recognized that
society places tremendous value on education as the key to individual
opportunities which form the "foundation for our democratic institu-
tions and our place in the global economy." 216 Specifically, the Clare-
mont court noted that the "very existence of government was declared
by the framers to depend upon the intelligence of its citizens." 217
The Claremont court further reasoned that "even a minimalist view
of educational adequacy recognizes the role of education in preparing
citizens to participate in the exercise of voting and First Amendment
rights."218 The court noted that because rights such as voting and free
speech are recognized as fundamental, it. is "illogical to place the
means to exercise those rights on less substantial constitutional footing
than the rights themselves." 2 ' 9
After holding that education is a fundamental right under the
New Hampshire Constitution, the Claremont court stated that in order
to deliver a constitutionally adequate public education for all children,
the cause of any funding disparity must be examined by a standard of
212 703 A.2d 1353, 1360-61 (Conn, 1997).
211 See id. at 1358.
212 See id. at 1359.
215 /d. at 1358
214 See id.
215 See Claremont, 703 A.2d at 1358.
216 Id.
217 1d.
218 Id.
219 See id. at 1359.
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strict judicial scrutiny. 220 In applying strict scrutiny to the state educa-
tion finance scheme, the court noted that comparable funding must
be assured in order that every school district will have the funds
necessary to provide such education. 22 ' Thus, the Claremont court held
that education is a fundamental right, that state infringement of this
right must. be examined with judicial strict scrutiny and that compara-
ble educational funding must. be  assured to pass constitutional mus-
ter.222
2. Connecticut
Although Claremont is a recent case, the occurrence of states
striking down slate education finance structures is not a recent devel-
opment. 223 In 1977, the Supreme Court of Connecticut held in Horton
v. Meskill that the right to education is fundamental under the Con-
necticut Constitution and any infringement of that right must be
strictly scrutinized. 221 In Horton, public school students sought a decla-
ratory judgment to render the state education finance scheme uncon-
stitutional. 225 The Connecticut public schools were financed such that
a disparity of per pupil expenditures existed between communities. 226
Local school districts raised the majority of educational funding
through local tax assessments which resulted in funding differences. 227
In arriving at its decision, the Horton court began by referencing
the Rodriguez decision. 228 The Connecticut Supreme Court recognized
that decisions of the United States Supreme Court defining fundamen-
tal rights arc only persuasive authority and are to be followed only
when they provide more individual protection than is guaranteed by a
state constitution. 229 The Horton court specifically noted that the
"strength of the Rodriguez dissenting opinion has had great impact on
state education financing decisions." 2" The court also recited the lan-
guage from Brown where the United States Supreme Court stated that
220 See Claremont, 703 A.2d at 1359.
221 See id.
222 Id. at 1358-59.
229
	
generally Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (1977).
221 1d. at 372-74.
225 See id. at 361.
228 See id, at 366. For example, the average per pupil expenditure in one community was
approximately $1245, while the average expenditure in another community was approximately
$813. See id. at 366-67.
227 See id. at 367-68. Approximately 70% of education funding came from local tax levy; 25%
came from the state; only 5% came from federal sources. See id.. at 366.
228 See I !orlon, 376 A.2d at 371 (citing Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 133-34).
225 See id,
2" Id. at 372.
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"education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments ... such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken
to provide it, is a right which must. be
 made available to all on equal
terms. "25 '
Thus, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that the state system
of financing education is an interference with a "fundamental right"
to education, and requires strict judicial scrutiny. 232 The Horton court,
in applying strict scrutiny to the state education finance scheme, fur-
ther held that variations in funding produce variations in the quality
of instruction. 2'3 Specifically, the court realized that students receiving
a lesser per pupil expenditure received an education that was a "sub-
stantial degree lower in both breadth and quality" than those receiving
higher per pupil expenditures. 234
Finally, the Horton court stated that discrimination in providing
educational services is not excusable merely because an "adequate"
level of benefits is afforded to al1. 235 The court noted that "Nhe Equal
Protection Clause is not addressed to minimal sufficiency, but rather
to the unjustifiable inequalities of state action." 235 Thus, the state edu-
cation finance structure was deemed unconstitutional because it in-
fringed upon a fundamental right to education in the State of Con-
necticut; such funding disparities did not survive the judicial strict
scrutiny of the Equal Protection Clause of the Connecticut Constitu-
tion.237 The decision effectively mandated an equal per pupil expendi-
ture throughout the state."'
3. Wyoming
In 1980, in Washakie County School District v. Herschler, the Su-
preme Court of Wyoming held that (1) the state school financing
scheme was unconstitutional because it failed to afford equal protec-
tion to all students and (2) education is a fundamental right deserving
judicial strict scrutiny. 2M In Washakie, local school districts and public
school students sought a declaratory judgment holding that the state
education finance structure was a violation of equal protection guar-
231 Id, (citing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
232 See id. at 372-74.
233 See Horton, 376 A.2d at 374,
234 See id.
235 See id. at 373.
236 1d.
237 See id, at 374-75.
233 See Horton, 376 A.2d at 374-75.
299 606 P.2d 310, 315, 333 (Wyo. 1980).
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antces under the Wyoming Constitution because of disparities in per
pupil expenditures. 24° First, the court referred to Rodriguez, and noted
that a state may go beyond rights as defined by the United States
Supreme Court."' The Washakie court then concluded that education
is a fundamental right in Wyoming. 242 In doing so, the court recited
the language in Brown, where the Court stated that "education is the
most. important function of state and local governments . . . ."243 The
court then reasoned that any state action affecting a fundamental
interest must be reviewed with judicial strict scrutiny.244 The court
stated that when a fundamental right is burdened, even if there is a
compelling state interest such as providing education, the state must
prove that there is no less onerous or burdensome alternative by which
this objective may be achieved. 245
Importantly, the court rejected the contention that funding does
not relate to the quality of cducation. 246 In fact, the court specifically
stated that "it is nothing more than an illusion" to believe that the
disparity in financial resources does not relate directly to the quality
of education. 247 Thus, the court reasoned that there is no practicable
method of achieving equality of education without achieving equality
of financing. 248
Because education was a fundamental right requiring judicial
strict scrutiny, the court held that the state had not met its burden of
showing no less onerous alternatives. 245 The court posited that different
levels of state assistance could equalize the local spending disparities
and, therefore, equalize the differences in educational opportunity. 25°
Thus, the court held that the state education finance scheme was
unconstitutional because the disparity in per pupil education expen-
ditures was a violation of equal protection guarantees.25 '
The three examples of state law discussed here reveal that in many
states: (1) education is a fundamental right under state constitutions;
(2) disparities of educational funding arc infringements of this right;
296
	 id. at 315.
241 See id. at 332-38.
242 See id. at 333.
245 See id. at 339-34 (citing Braum, 347 U.S. at 493).
244 See Washakie, 606 P.2d at 333.
245
 See id.
246 See id. at 334.
2471d.
24e
	 id.
249 See Washakie, 606 13.2c1 at 335.
250
 See id.
251 See id.
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(3) these infringements should be reviewed under judicial strict scru-
tiny; and (4) state statutes which cause a disparity in educational fund-
ing have been found unconstitutional under state constitutions.
IV. ARE THE EQUAL PROTECTION GUARANTEES OF A GENERAL
EDUCATION STUDENT VIOLATED BECAUSE OF SPECIAL EDUCATION
MANDATES?
Part I of this Note established that federal and state special edu-
cation statutes cause reductions in funding for general education bud-
gets."' Part II established that reductions in funding are directly attrib-
utable to reductions in education quality and services."' The analysis
now examines these reductions as a violation of a general education
student's equal protection guarantees.
Special education mandates do not violate a general education
student's equal protection guarantees unless education is a fundamen-
tal right. 254
 That is, if education is a fundamental right, then special
education statutes are probably unconstitutional because they infringe
upon a general education student's right to education. As discussed in
Part II, special education mandates cause a direct reduction in general
education services."' If education is not a state or federal fundamental
right, however, then special education statutes analyzed under the
rational basis test appear to be rationally related to the legitimate state
objective of providing special education students with a free appropri-
ate education.256
Courts must apply strict scrutiny when analyzing special education
statutes which infringe upon general education if education is a fun-
damental right.'" Finally, a court applying strict scrutiny would likely
presume that such special education statutes are unconstitutional be-
cause they arc not narrowly drafted, and there are other less burden-
some alternative.""
252 See supra notes 1-95 and accompanying text.
253 See supra notes 96-130 and accompanying text.
254 See supra notes 143-52 and accompanying text.
255 See supra notes 96-130 and accompanying text.
256 See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text; see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
470-71 (1991); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230, 234 (1981); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79
(1911).
257 See supra notes 143-52 and accompanying text; see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S,
618, 630, 634 (1969); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666-67 (1966);
Skinner v, Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
258 See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text; see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900,
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A. Special Education Statutes Violate a General Education Student's
Equal Protection Guarantees Under State Law
The test student discussed earlier realized that special education
mandates caused reductions in the general education budget at Any-
town Central High School over the past ten years. This Part of the
analysis posits that such a student has a valid claim under the equal
protection clause's of most state constitutions. A student has a valid state
claim because (1) education is a fundamental right under many state
constitutions as discussed in Part III; (2) special education statutes
infringe upon that right as discussed in Parts I and II; (3) judicial strict
scrutiny must apply to such infringements; and (4) such statutes fail
the slrict scrutiny test. 2'9
State equal protection clauses virtually mirror the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the United States Constitution, declaring that no state
shall "deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the laws."26° As
discussed in Part III, a majority of states confronted with the issue have
decided that education is a fundamental right under state constitutions
and infringements of this right must be analyzed with judicial strict
scrutiny.261
Furthermore, education is clearly burdened because variations in
funding produce variations in the quality of instruction. 262 In fact, as
the court noted in Washakie, "it is nothing more than an illusion to
believe that the disparity in financial resources does not relate directly
to the quality of education." 2t As discussed in Horton, decreased per
pupil expenditures lead to an education that is "substantially decreased
in both breadth and quality." 2"
Additionally, as the court stated in Washakie, there must be no less
onerous alternative by which this objective is achieved. 2" As stag-
904 (1995); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227, 235 (1995); City of Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984).
266 See infra notes 260-320 and accompanying text.
2° Compare U.S. CoNs•. amend. XIV, § 1, with CONN. CONST•, art. 1, § 1 (1997) (all men ...
arc equal in rights), 20 (no person shall be denied the equal protection of the law); N.H. CONST.
pt. 1, arts. 1 (1988 & Stipp. 1997) (all men arc born equally free and independent), 2 (equality
of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged), 12 (every member of the community
has a right to be protected by it); WYO. CONST., art. 1, § 1 (1997) (all members of the human
race are equal), 34 (all laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation).
261 See, e.g., Claremont, 703 A.2d at 1359; DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 747, 776; Roosevelt, 877 P.2d
at 238, 242, 244; Bismarck, 511 N.W.2d at 259; Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 386; Alabama Coalition, 624
So. 2d at 147, 151, 156-57; Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 315; Washakie, 606 P.2d at 333; Pantry, 255 S.E.2d
at 679; Horton, 376 A.2d at 646; Serrano, 557 •2d at 766.
t(2 See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
4°s
	
P.2d 310, 333 (1980).
264 376 A•2d 359, 374 (1977).
c'.1 See 606 P.2d at 333.
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gested by the Washakie court, statutes can be written such that general
education budgets are not infringed upon; statutes can, for example,
require equalized expenditures.266 Furthermore, spending limits could
be placed upon the implementation of individualized education plans.
The statutes could be narrowly tailored to ensure that special educa-
tion students do not take advantage of broad language; statutes could
delineate the types of disabilities covered and the types of services
provided. 267
 Additionally, special education statutes are only partially
funded by states and the federal government. 268 Clearly, the least on-
erous special education statute is one that is completely federally or
state funded. Such a statute would not force local school districts to
reduce general education budgets. Thus, a special education statute in
Anytown, U.S.A. which infringes upon a general education budget
probably would not survive judicial strict scrutiny. 269
Furthermore, merely providing an adequate level of education for
a general education student does not excuse a state from an equal
protection violation. 21" As discussed earlier, even under state constitu-
tions, equal protection clauses are not addressed to minimal suffi-
ciency, but rather to the unjustifiable inequalities of state action. 27 '
These stark differences provide the crux of an equal protection chal-
lenge.272
It seems likely that a general education student's equal protection
challenge under most state constitutions would be successful. Most
state courts dealing with the issue have held that education is a funda-
mental right deserving judicial strict scrutiny. 2" Furthermore, the
above analysis indicates that state statutes which decrease general edu-
cation funding will most likely fail a strict scrutiny analysis, and courts
will strike them down as unconstitutional. 274
266 See id. at 335-36.
267 See Zernike, Mar. 30, 1997, supra note 11 (noting that special education students take
advantage of the broad language of special education statutes).
268 See, e.g., Markoe, supra note 15, at 1; see also supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
269 See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text; see also Miller, 515 U.S. at 904; Adarand,
515 U.S. at 227, 235; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; Bernal 467 U.S. at 219.
27° See, e.g., Horton, 376 A.2d at 373; see also San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 82, 90, 92 (1973) (Marshall, Douglas, jj., dissenting).
271 See, e.g., Horton, 376 A.2d at 373.
272 See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 82, 90 (Marshall, Douglas, jj,, dissenting).
273 See, e.g., Claremont, 703 A.2d at 1359; DeRolph, 677 N.E.2d at 747, 776; Roosevelt, 877 P.2d
at 238, 242, 244; Bismarck 511 N.W.2d at 259; Scan, 443 S.E.2d at 386; Alabama Coalition, 624
So. 2d at 147, 151, 156-57; Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 315; Washakie, 606 P,2d at 333; Pauley, 255 S.E.2d
at 679; Horton, 376 A.2d at 646; Serrano, 557 P.2d at 766.
274 See supra notes 259-73 and accompanying text.
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B. Special Education Statutes Should Violate a General Education
Student's Equal Protection Guarantees Under Federal Law
The special education statutes of all fifty states merely conform to
the minimum standards set forth in the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act. 275 Therefore, if state special education statutes violate
general education students' protection guarantees under state consti-
tutions, it is the IDEA that infringes on the rights of general education
students. 276 The IDEA, a federal law, can only be challenged under the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution, which does
not explicitly guarantee the right to an education; the IDEA, therefore,
is constitutional as analyzed under current federal law. 277
In order for a general education student to prevail against the
inequities produced by the IDEA or any state action which decreases
educational funding, the United States Supreme Court must recognize
education as a fundamental right under the United States Constitu-
tion. 278 If statutes such as the IDEA, which indirectly cause decreases
in educational services, were analyzed using judicial strict scrutiny, they
would suffer the same fate as their state counterparts. 279 Clearly, it can
be argued that the IDEA is not narrowly tailored, and there are less
burdensome alternatives. 28° For example, the statute could be rewritten
such that the federal government must provide more than seven per-
cent of the funding for special education. In the alternative, the statute
could be redrafted, placing spending caps on individual special edu-
cation students, specifying certain disabilities or prohibiting special
education programs from burdening general education. 28 ' Overall, if
the IDEA were to survive judicial strict scrutiny, it must be re-crafted
such that it. does not infringe upon general education funding. 282
275 Compare 20 U.S.C. § MOO et seq. (1990 & 1998 Stipp.), with CONN. CaN. STAT. § 10-76 et
seq. (1997); N.11, REV. SI AT. ANN. § 186-C et seq, (1988 & 1997 Stipp.); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 21-2-501 et seq. (Michie 1997).
278 See supra notes 277-82 and accompanying text.
277 See U.S. Coss -r. amend. XIV, § 1 (Equal Protection Clause); see also U.S. Coss•r. art. VI
(Supremacy Clause).
278
 Cf. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37-38.
279 See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text; see also Miller, 515 U.S. at 904; Adarand
Constructors, Inc., 515 U.S. at 227, 235; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; Bernal, 467 U.S. at 219.
288 See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 904; Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227, 235; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440;
Bernal, 467 U.S. at 219.
281 See, e.g„ Mat koe, supra nom 15, at 1.
282 See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text; see also Miller, 515 U.S. at 904; Adarand,
515 U.S. at 227, 235; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; Bernal, 467 U.S. at 219.
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1. The United States Supreme Court Should Recognize Education
as a Fundamental Right under the United States Constitution
a. The Court Has Already Recognized Other Non-Explicit Rights as
Fundamental
In order for the test student from Anytown Central High School
to prevail against the IDEA, she must first get around the United States
Supreme Court's decision in RodrigueZ. 283 First, the Court in Rodriguez
disregarded its own prior decisions when it reasoned that in order for
a right to be fundamental, it must be explicitly or implicitly guaranteed
in the text of the United States Constitution. 284 As discussed in Part III,
the rights to travel, procreate, criminally appeal and vote arc not
explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the text of the United States
Constitution."' The Court has afforded, however, each of these rights
fundamental status and has analyzed infringements of these rights with
judicial strict scrutiny. 286
b. Education is Inextricably Intertwined with Other Constitutional Rights
Second, the Court in Rodriguez neglected its prior reasoning by
failing to recognize that other fundamental rights are intrinsically
interwoven with constitutionally guaranteed rights. 287 In their dissents,
Supreme Court Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall noted that the
fundamentality of a right is a function of the right's importance to ef-
fectuate a constitutionally guaranteed right. 288 Therefore, as the nexus
between an explicitly or implicitly guaranteed right and another inter-
est tightens, the interest becomes fundamental, and a more rigorous
degree of judicial scrutiny must be applied when analyzing infringe-
ments of the subject. 289 For example, the right to vote, although not
explicitly guaranteed in the United States Constitution, is a necessary
component to participate in the governmental process."° Additionally,
283 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 38-40 (failing to deem education a fundamental right under
the United States Constitution).
284 See id. at 62-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
283 See id. at 99-101 (Marshall, Douglas, Jj„ dissenting).
288 See, e.g., Shapiro v, Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630, 634 (1969) (holding right to travel
fundamental); Harper v. Virginia State lid. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666-67 (1966) (holding
right to vote fundamental); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(holding right to marry and procreate fundamental).
287 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 62-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
288 See id. at 63 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 113-14 (Marhsall, Douglas, X., dissenting).
289 See id. at 62-63 (Brennan,", dissenting).
'm See id, at 63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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the right to travel is necessary for a citizen to exercise his or her rights
of constitutionally guaranteed liberty. 291
Similarly, education is a necessary component for a citizen to
exercise his or her constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech. 292
Education is needed for a citizen to vote and participate in the gov-
ernmental process; the rights of free expression and voting themselves
hinge upon the adequacy of one's education. 2" As the Court recog-
nized in Brown, education is required "in the performance of our most
basic public responsibilities," even service in the armed forces. 29^ Edu-
cation is the very foundation of good citizenship. 295 It is a principal
instrument for awakening children to cultural values and for preparing
them for later professional training. 296 The Court itself has doubted
whether any child can reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
or she is denied the opportunity of an education. 297
c. The United States Supreme Court' Inappropriately Worked Backwards
in Rodriguez
Third, in performing its fundamental rights analysis in Rodriguez,
the Court worked backwards from a pre-determined end.'" A proper
fundamental rights analysis looks first to see if the burdened right is
fundamental. 299 If a right is deemed fundamental, then a court must
apply judicial strict scrutiny; this method is standard equal protection
analysis utilized by courts and coinmentators. 3" The Court in Rod-
riguez, however, based its decision on the "inappropriateness of the
strict-scrutiny test," and worked backwards to conclude that education
should not be a fundamental right. The Court justified the means of its
decision by its unwillingness to apply strict scrutiny in similar cases.'"'
The 5-4 majority was overly influenced by the Fact that to decide
otherwise would invalidate school financing statutes nationwide and
291 See id. at 99-101 (Marshall, Douglas,	 dissenting)•.
292 See Rodriguez, 111 U.S. at 63 (Brennan, J., dissenting), 113-14 (Marshall, Douglas, 1.,
dissenting).
295 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 63 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
294 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
295 See id.
211
" See id.
297 See id.
298 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40.
299 See, e.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 630, 634; Harper; 383 U.S. at 666-67; Skinner, 316 U.S. at
541.
209 See, e.g., Miller, 515 U.S. at 904; Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227, 235; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440;
Bernal, 467 U.S. at 219.
9111 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 40.
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was less concerned that the state statutes infringed upon a fundamen-
tal intcrest."2
d. General Education Reductions are Ultimately Caused by the
Requirements of a Federal Statute
Fourth, the problem presented by this Note is much more sig-
nificant than the facts presented in Rodriguez. The Court in Rodriguez
wanted to tread lightly in the area of education, a responsibility tradi-
tionally left to the states."3 Rodriguez, however, dealt with the constitu-
tionality of state finance laws enacted entirely under the color of state
law."' The problem addressed by this Note is created and perpetuated
by federal law: the IDEA."' Therefore, it would be misleading for the
Court to apply the same analysis in this case.
The Court cannot fail to deem education a fundamental right
under the pretext of states' rights when Congress has itself fundamen-
tally infringed upon those very rights left to the states. Thus, when
dealing with the problem presented by this Note, the import of edu-
cation as a fundamental right is central to a general education stu-
dent's equal protection claim.
c. Current Federal Law Condones Discrimination
Finally, failing to recognize education as a fundamental right.
allows unequal, invidious discrimination to occur as long as it is ration-
ally related to a permissible state goal. 3U6 Substantial disparities in per
pupil expenditures produce a discriminatory impact on schoolchil-
dren."' Failure to recognize education as a fundamental right means
that the Court will fail to strictly scrutinize any infringements to that
right." Thus, unless education is deemed a fundamental right under
the United States Constitution, federal action which causes great edu-
cational funding disparity will essentially be condoned. 309 The Equal
Protection Clause was not established to guarantee a minimum level
3°2 See id. at 44, 54.
3°3
	
id. at 40.
30H See id. at 1-8.
305 See 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
306 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 68 (White, Douglas, Brennan,11., dissenting).
31}7 See id. at 72.
3" See, e.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618, 630, 634; Harper; 583 U.S. at 666-67; Skinner, 316 U.S.
at 541.
30°
	 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 68 (White, Douglas, Brennan, D., dissenting).
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of constitutional adequacy. 3 " Rather, it was established to guarantee
equal protection of •the laws. 3 "
Had one justice voted the other way in Rodriguez, it seems clear
that the discrimination against general education students caused by
the IDEA would not be tolerated. Even if the Court fails to categorize
education as a fundamental right, however, it is completely plausible
that the unique circumstances and discrimination caused by the IDEA
would lead it to invalidate the law."" The United States Supreme Court
has consistently recognized the vital importance of education." In
Brown, the Court used the importance of education as the vehicle for
racial desegrcgation.3" In Plyter, the Court again stressed the impor-
tance of education, used a heightened level of scrutiny and invalidated
a law burdening access to education. 313 Here, the Court may focus on
the vital importance of education to invalidate a law which causes a
direct reduction in general education services nationwide.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, - some of the effects of the IDEA have run counter to its
original intention. 316 The combination of the circumstances and argu-
ments advanced in this Note could lead the Court to apply heightened
or strict scrutiny without finding education to be a fundamental
right."''' Applying any heightened level of scrutiny to the invidiously
discriminatory effects of the IDEA upon general education students
would most likely lead to the invalidation of the law. 3 ' 8 Thus, federal
efforts to rectify the discriminatory effects of the IDEA must focus
upon the issue of special education costs and services. Congress cannot
mandate such costly services and fail to provide adequate funding.
Failure to do so imposes a cost upon localities which manifests itself as
inequality and a reduction in general education services.
This Note does not purport to resolve the discriminatory impact
upon general education students caused by the IDEA. It. does, however,
518 See id. at 82 (Marshall, Douglas, .11., dissenting).
511 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
912 Cf Plyler v. Doc, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982).
See id. at 221.
511 See 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
515 See 457 U.S. at 224, 230.
316 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
515 Cf. Plyter, 457 U.S. at 224, 230.
518 See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 227, 295 (1995); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985);
Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984).
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argue that general education students have possible recourse under
the law. Under most state constitutions, such deprivations would likely
be found unconstitutional because education is a fundamental right
and judicial strict scrutiny applies. 319 As we have seen, however, state
special education statutes are enacted pursuant to IDEA require-
ments. 320
 Thus, outside of a legislative solution, this problem will ulti-
. mately be resolved only if education is deemed a fundamental right
under the United States Constitution.
GREGORY F. CORBETT
319
 See, e.g., Claremont, 703 A.2d at 1359; DeRo1ph, 677 N.E.2d at 747, 776; Roosevelt, 877 P.2d
at 238, 242, 244; Bismarck, 511 N.W.2d at 259; Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 386; Alabama Coalition, 624
So, 2d at 147, 151, 156-57; Skeen, 505 N.W.2d at 315; Washakie, 606 P.2d at 333; Pauley, 255 S.F.,2d
at 679; Horton, 376 A.2d at 646; Serrano, 557 P.2d at 766.
3" Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., with CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-76 et seq.; N.11. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 186-C et seq.; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 21-2-501 et seq.
